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Water Rights Taxation
The water situation in many California counties, such as periodic scarcity
and court-imposed restrictions, emphasizes the significance of taxing water rights.
The pros and cons of such taxation may be arguable, but it appears that any
relief from the operation of the tax laws in this field can be afforded only by
amending the California constitution. However, the following discussion will
attempt to set out the present law in this area and how it is applied.
Questions which frequently confront governing agencies in water rights
taxation cases include: the type of water right subject to taxation; taxability of
rights owned or controlled by mutual water companies; claims of double taxation
because of taxation of parcels on which water is used; the extent of the authority
of the local board of equalization; determining market value of a water right by
capitalizing the cost of water from an alternate source of supply; and the validity
of the so-called "basin to basin" theory of assessment.
TAxAnBimr
The California constitution provides that all property within the state is
subject to ad valorem taxation for support of local government.' This constitu-
tional provision further requires that all property be assessed "in proportion to its
value."2 Thus all kinds of property, wherever situated in the state, are subject to
taxation.8 Based upon this constitutional provision, the legislature has defined
"value" to mean "the amount at which property would be taken in payment of a
just debt from a solvent debtor."4
In Spring Valley Water Co. v. Alameda,5 the court was confronted with the
question of the taxability of riparian water rights where such water was diverted
from the riparian land for use on other land. The court's decision was that the tax
or assessment on the right to divert riparian water was unlawful because the
description on the assessment roll was too vague to permit distinction from
riparian rights owned by reason of ownership of land abutting the stream.6 The
court also doubted the taxability of a riparian right even when separated from
the land.7
It appears that the water company involved in the case delivered water to the
city of San Francisco and that Alameda County continued to levy taxes upon
its water rights on behalf of the county and also on behalf of special districts
lying within the watershed. The point of diversion of the stream in question lay
in the county but outside any of the districts.
In 1927 the company again took the matter to court.8 It is worth noting that
'CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
Ibid.
See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 103. There are certain exemptions provided in the constitution
which are not material to this study.
'CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 110.
5 24 Cal.App. 278, 141 Pac. 38 (1914).
6 Id. at 282, 141 Pac. at 39.
Id. at 281, 141 Pac. at 39.
'Spring Valley Water Co. v. Alameda, 88 Cal.App. 157, 263 Pac. 318 (1927).
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the only taxes the company sought to recover were those paid to the districts,
and the only question on appeal was whether any taxable right was situated in
any of the districts. The court concluded that when by grant a riparian water
right is separated from the land and conveyed to another, such right constitutes
an individual and separate property rightY The court held that the situs of this
right was the point of diversion, and since this situs was not located in any of the
special districts, no taxable property right was present therein to tax. 10 Although
this case has been relied upon by those arguing double taxation through the use
of the water by shareholders of a mutual water company, a careful reading will
indicate that the holding of the court does not support such a double taxation
theory.
Repeating, we hold that the situs of the right here involved is at the place of
its enjoyment, namely, at the point of diversion. Conceding, as claimed by
appellant, that a right may be taxed even if not enjoyed, nevertheless when
the right and the actual user thereof combine, the necessity of speculating
upon the situs of an unenjoyed right does not arise. The use locates the right.11
In 1936 another dispute arose between Alameda County and San Francisco
interests. The city purchased the water rights of the Spring Valley Water Company
and claimed a tax exemption for such rights as city-owned property. The
California Supreme Court found that the right to divert riparian water was a
taxable right and that the constitutional exemption of publicly owned property
did not apply, because the voters amended the constitution in 1914 to permit
taxation of property owned by a public entity if such property is located outside
the entity's boundaries. 1 2 Here, the point of diversion was outside the city
boundaries, and thus the right was taxable.
In Waterford Irr. Dist. v. Stanislaus County13 the question arose whether an
appropriative right to divert water from a stream was taxable. It was asserted
that the cases above all dealt with riparian rights which traditionally have been
considered real property, whereas a taking by appropriation should not be
considered as property. The court, however, did not agree, and concluded that
such a right constitutes land as defined in the California constitution. 1 4 It was
also urged that use of the water by landowners increased the value of their land
and thus the assessment thereon; that also taxing the district's right constituted
double taxation. The court did not agree.
In the text of 51 American Jurisprudence, at page 337, supported by numer-
ous authorities, it is said that "before invalid double taxation may be said to
exist, both taxes must have been imposed in the same year, for the same
purpose, upon property owned by the same person, and by the same taxing
authority." . . . The right here taxed, that is, the appropriative water right,
is alleged to have been purchased by the appellant district from its previous
owner and we think that, within the meaning of the constitutional exception,
Id. at 167, 263 Pac. at 323.
10 Id. at 168, 263 Pac. at 323.
"Id. at 169, 263 Pac. at 323. Emphasis supplied.
'2 San Francisco v. Alameda, 5 Cal.2d 243, 245, 54 P.2d 462, 464 (1936).
'8 102 Cal.App.2d 839, 228 P.2d 341 (1951).
14 Id. at 847, 228 P.2d at 346.
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it is owned by that district. Taxes levied upon it therefore are not taxes
upon the property of the landowners within the district, and consequently the
tax fails to meet the test of double taxation, not being a tax upon property
owned by the same person. 15
In the following year, 1952, the Alpaugh Irrigation District challenged Kern
County's tax on the district's right to pump subsurface water and divert it for
district use. The district contended that it did not own a separate taxable water
right, for it owned the land of origin and was merely exercising its overlying
water rights. Again the court disagreed, holding that insofar as the district
pumped and diverted water in excess of the need of the overlying land it had
both an appropriative and a prescriptive right.'6 These rights are land and thus
taxable. 17
A comparatively recent case, North Kern Water Storage District v. Kern,18
involved taxation of a district right to divert water fr6m the Kern River to non-
riparian land. Relying on the 1927 Spring Valley case, 19 the district contended
that the situs of its water right was within district boundaries and therefore
exempt, because its right to use the water was limited to lands within the district.
Justice Coughlin, speaking for a unanimous court, held that the situs was the
point of diversion and that it was the same regardless of the type of water right
involved.20
At this juncture the distinction must be noted between water rights and the
water subject to use by an exercise of such rights. . . . [T]he place where
the water may be used does not necessarily establish the situs of the rights
which enable the owner to use that water at that place. . . .The paramount
right conferred by the agreement in this case is the right to divert water from
the river. For tax purposes the situs of this right should be located at the place
where it is exercised, i.e., at the point of diversion.
2
'
In this case the plaintiff had acquired its rights from certain land companies
whose rights in turn were not restricted as to use. However, when the rights were
transferred to the plaintiff, the companies restricted the use of the water by the
district to the lands within its boundaries. This limitation, the court held, did
not affect the nature of the rights, only their extent.22 Thus, "as the transfer to
plaintiff did not change the nature of these rights their situs was not changed.."
23
The court also made another very important distinction.
[T]he fact that the companies had the right to use water which the plaintiff
did not use had no effect on the right of plaintiff to use that water. The right
to use and actual use are two different things. . . .Failure to exercise that
right did not affect the status thereof as "matters" or "things" capable of
15 Id. at 848, 228 P.2d at 347.
"0 Alpaugh Irrigation District v. County of Kern, 113 Cal.App.2d 286, 293, 248 P.2d 117, 120(1952).
17 Ibid.
"1 179 Cal.App.2d 268, 3 Cal.Rptr. 636 (1960).
19 Spring Valley Water Co. v. Alameda, 88 Cal.App. 157, 263 Pac. 318 (1927).
10 North Kern Water Storage District v. Kern, 179 Cal.App.2d 268, 278, 3 Cal.Rptr. 636, 643
(1960).
21 Id. at 276, 277, 3 Cal.Rptr. at 642.
22 Id. at 277, 3 Cal.Rptr. at 642, 643.
21 Id. at 278, 3 Cal.Rptr. at 643.
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ownership for the purpose of taxation within the meaning of the constitu-
tion.2 4
The distinction between the right held by a mutual water company and the
actual use by the shareholders is illustrated in Glendale v. Crescenta Mutual
Water Co.2 5 In this case a city ordinance levied an excise tax of five cents per 100
cubic feet of water purchased from any water distributing agency for use within
the city. The incidence of the tax was upon the use of water purchased for that
purpose and every user was declared liable for the same.26 The mutual water
company (or other water delivering agency) was required to collect the tax and
pay it to the city. The city's charges to its own customers were large enough to
cover a similar amount.
Respondent's counsel assert that the water belongs to the shareholders, that
they pay nothing for it when delivered, that the only charge paid is for pro-
duction and distribution and hence there is no purchase or sale. . . . [11n
the case of shareholders who own and pool water rights their mutual water
company becomes merely their agent in producing and delivering to them their
own water. But that is not true of water which is owned by the mutual
company and delivered by it to its shareholders even though their stock is
appurtenant to their respective lands. . . . It does not appear that any of
the shareholders own any water rights or that they ever had any which they
could have conveyed to the company. . . . All the evidence supports the
finding that defendant is the owner of the water furnished to its shareholders;
hence their payment of the cost of production and delivery is the rendition of
consideration for the acquisition of property belonging to another-a purchase
and sale. It follows that there was no error in the holding that the defendant
and its shareholders are subject to the excise levied by [the] ordinance. 27
It thus appears that a mutual water company is a "person" which is distinct
from its shareholders. Any right owned by it is not a right owned by the share-
holders individually. 28 Further, no relief from taxation of water rights can be
afforded a mutual water company unless'it shows through competent evidence
that it does not own the water right,29 and such a state of facts would not make
the assessment or tax invalid as to the actual owner of the right. For example,
assume that each of a group of land owners owned an appurtenant, appropriative
right to divert water from the Santa Ana River to irrigate non-riparian land.
Assume also that each conveyed his right to a water company by a contract
providing that he continued to own the right and that the company was merely a
distributing agent for the group. These owners have placed the company in a
position of control. These water rights are assessable to the company. If, however,
the actual owners notify the assessor of their respective interests, they should be
taxed rather than the company. If such step is taken, and the assessor does not
show a separate assessment for the appurtenant water right, it will be deemed
assessed as a part of the assessment of the land to which it is appurtenant.
24 Id. at 279, 3 Cal.Rptr. at 644.
:5 135 Cal.App.2d 784, 288 P.2d 105 (1955).
id. at 802, 288 P.2d at 117.
27 Id. at 801, 802, 288 P.2d at 116, 117.
1s See Consolidated Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 63, 269 Pac. 915, 920
(1928), stressing this point and indicating the court's consideration of the varying types of ownership.
2' See, e.g., Glendale v. Crescenta Mutual Water Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 784, 288 P.2d 105 (1955).
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If, however, the water right is owned by the company, and the shareholders'
only right is to a right to a certain amount of the company's water, the company
is the proper taxpayer. This is true whether the share or right against the company
is or is not appurtenant to the land upon which the water -is used.
Where the owner of a water right retains title thereto under certain circum-
stances,3 0 the question may arise as to whether it is appurtenant to his land. If so,
it is deemed taxed with the land, unless the assessor makes separate assessments. 3 '
His water right remains real property while any share of stock issued by the
mutual water company as evidence of such right is merely personal property.
3 2
It should be kept in mind, however, that a share of water stock is not presumed
to be appurtenant to any land.
Whether such appurtenance exists is a question of fact, to be determined upon
extrinsic evidence, and the burden of establishing such fact is upon him who
claims a right to the appurtenance. Shares of stock, as such are not pre-
sumptively appurtenant to land, and if the plaintiff would claim that the
shares of stock in question represent water-rights or privileges which are
appurtenant . . . it was incumbent upon it to introduce evidence of such
fact.3 3
The question of appurtenance becomes important in this tax problem only if
the shareholder actually owns the right to divert the water and claims he has been
taxed more than once. If he owns no right to divert water, his share in a mutual
company, even though it may be appurtenant, is a share oily in the assets of the
corporation and does not affect the taxability of the water right owned by the
company as one of its assets.
ASSESSMENT
For a fuller understanding of the question, it is necessary to consider also
the principles governing the assessor and the board of supervisors in taxation of
property.
When the assessor finds a diversionary water right which is owned or
controlled by a mutual water company, he correctly places the water right on
the assessment roll and the tax based on the assessment is properly directed to
such corporation.
Revenue and Taxation Code section 610 provides that land once described on
the roll need not be described a second time and any person claiming and
desiringto be assessed for it may have his name inserted with that of the assessee.
A subsequent section provides that when a person is assessed in a representative
capacity, the assessment shall be entered separately from his individual assess-
ment.3 4 Furthermore, "a mistake in the name of the owner or supposed owner of
real estate does not render invalid any assessment or any tax sale."35
no Stratton v. Railroad Comm'n, 186 -Cal. 119, 198 Pac. 1051 (1921); Frazee v. Railroad
Comm'n, 185 Cal. 690, 201 Pac. 921 (1921); Hildreth v. Montecito Water Co., 139 Cal. 22, 72
Pac. 395 (1903).
"Frederick v. Dickey, 91 Cal. 358, 361, 27 Pac. 742, 743 (1891).
32 Locke v. Yorba Irrigation Co., 35 Cal.2d 205, 217 P.2d 425 (1950).
"Bank of Visalia v. Smith, 146 Cal. 398, 400-01, 81 Pac. 542, 543 (1905).
' CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 612.
"CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 613.
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It seems clear, therefore, that if the assessor does not have full information
as to the ownership of property rights, he has done his duty when he ascertains
the person in control of such property and may conclude that the person in
control is the owner.3 0 The burden is upon the person in control to notify the
assessor of any different situation. It is also the burden of any person claiming
to be an owner to notify the assessor of his right. This would be particularly
applicable in cases in which the so-called water company is merely a distributing
company of water produced from rights owned by the shareholders.
Tilden v. Orange County37 illustrates the problem. This case involved a lease
of property to several persons. The lease was silent as to payment of taxes. Thus,
under the law, the lessor was obligated to pay them.3 8 However, the assessor made
his assessment showing the lessees as the taxpayers. The lessees paid the tax
under protest and sued to recover. In reviewing the judgment, the district court
of appeal held the assessment to be proper. True, the court said, the lessor is
obligated to pay the taxes on the property, but this is an obligation as between
him and his lessees. Such contractual duty is not binding on the assessor, and he
may name those in control of the property.3 9
The assessor, having found persons occupying and in possession of the prop-
erty, was authorized to assess it in the names of such persons. He is not
required to pass upon the condition of the title to the interests involved for
the purposes of taxation and assessment.40
It becomes apparent, therefore, that regardless of the contractual rights
between shareholders and a mutual water company, if the assessor finds the
company in possession and control of a water right, he may assume, in the absence
of information otherwise, that the company is the owner of the right. Where the
water company is merely a distributing agent, the real parties in interest may
bring the matter to the attention of the assessor through competent evidence of
ownership. 41 This step would not vitiate the tax, but it would correct the record
as to ownership. Such a shareholder may then state, "Now that I am shown as the
owner of my water right, I wish the assessment canceled because this right is
appurtenant to my land and must be deemed taxed as a part of that land."
Assuming that the particular right is sufficiently described on the roll as assessed
separately from such land, the shareholder has no right to cancellation of the
assessment. Appurtenant, riparian or overlying rights are deemed taxed as a part
of the land where there is no such separation of rights on the assessment roll.
The shareholder who has no water rights, per se, but whose share is repre-
sentative of a right to a certain amount of the water produced by the company
in the exercise of its water rights is not in a legal position to claim any adjustment
on the assessment of the company's right or any change in the ownership shown
36 46 CAL. JuR. 2d Taxation §§ 166, 169 (Supp. 1963).
"1 89 Cal.App.2d 586, 201 P.2d 86 (1949).
88 Id. at 587, 201 P.2d at 87.
80 Id. at 588, 201 P.2d at 88.
40 Id. at 588-89, 201 P.2d at 88. Emphasis supplied.
"CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 610-13.
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on the roll. Such rights are properly assessed to the company. This situation
follows whether or not the shareholder's share of stock is appurtenant to his land.
EQUALIZATION
The board of supervisors acting as a local board of equalization has limited
authority. It may perform only those functions permitted by the Revenue and
Taxation Code. Equalization of assessments on the local roll is within its power. 42
And it may direct the assessor to assess property which has escaped assessment,
to change amount, number, quantity or description of property on the assessment
roll, and to enter new assessments where any assessment is so incomplete as to
render collection doubtful. 43 The board may not raise or lower the entire local
roll 44 and may not make any reduction of an assessment unless an application
for such action has been filed with the board.
45
Additionally, the board of equalization has no jurisdiction to cancel an assess-
ment for a previous year even though it may have resulted in an unlawful tax.4 ,
The proper procedure in such cases would be filing application for cancellation
or refund, or payment under protest and a suit to recover taxes.4 7
In Flying Tiger Line v. Los Angeles48 it was pointed out that in making
assessments "the board is exercising judicial functions, and its decision as to the
value of the property and the fairness of the assessment so far as amount is
concerned constitutes an independent and conclusive judgment of the tribunal
created by law for the determination of that question."49 The determination of the
board on such matters will not be overturned normally unless it appears that
there has been an arbitrary and wilful imposition of unequal burdens upon certain
of the taxpayers "or unless there is something equivalent to fraud in the action
of the board."50 However, it is important also to note that "the lack of due process
distinguishing the procedural phase of these equalization matters as submitted
to the board furnishes an equally appropriate basis for the court's intervention
in protection of the plaintiff's constitutional rights."5 1
Thus, in comparing and equalizing assessed values, the board's decision of
fact is final. Where the board passes on a question of law, the courts are not
bound and may determine such legal questions anew. Where the questions are
mixed fact and law, there are no clear-cut guides, and the taxpayer must apply
to the board for "equalization" so as not to run the risk of failing to exhaust his
administrative remedy.
52
The lack of certainty as to the full extent of the board's authority is demon-
42 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605.
" CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1610-11.
44 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 9 1606.
" CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 1607.
46 Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal.App.2d 474, 478, 318 P.2d 172, 174, 175 (1952).
47 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § § 5096, 5137-39.
,s 51 Cal.2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958).
41 Id. at 320, 333 P.2d at 327.
50 Id. at 321, 333 P.2d at 327.
5' Ibid.
2 Bank v. Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 319, 217 P.2d 946 (1950); Sims v. Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d




strated by several recent decisions of the supreme court. In De Luz Homes, Inc. v.
San Diego,53 for example, the court established a formula for assessing possessory
interests in tax-exempt property. The interesting point, however, is that after
stating the formula, the court remanded the case to the local boards of equaliza-
tion for determination of the facts and ultimate assessments under the formula. 54
This action indicated a recognition of a rather broad authority of such a board
over assessment matters.
In 1958, however, there appears to have been sorme change in the thinking
of the majority of the court on the question of remand. In the Flying Tiger case,
decided subsequent to De Luz, the court refused to remand the case after de-
termining the legal question of pro rata taxation of an aircraft used in inter-
state commerce and refunded the entire tax paid under protest. 5  Justice Traynor,
dissenting, strongly urged the court to remand the matter to the local board as
had been done in the earlier case, since it was agreed there was some taxable
interest located in the county.
One may conclude, then, that while the board has limited powers, it may
consider the formula used by the assessor in assessing water rights to determine
whether such rights are being assessed equally with other kinds of real property
interests located within the county. Specifically, the board may consider the
application of any formula and the various factors involved.
METHOD OF ASSESSMENT OF WATER RIGHTS
Determining the value of various types of property rights involves the develop-
ment of methods or formulae to ascertain what the right would probably bring
on the open market. In the De Luz case, the court developed a formula for assess-
ing a private possessory interest in tax-exempt public property, basing the
formula upon anticipated income "capitalized" for the term of the lease. In their
computations the assessors were directed to consider any factors which might
adversely affect the full realization of possible income.5"
Some of the uncertainties involved may be "risk of partial or no receipt" of
income, "hazards of the investment," and "accepted concepts of a 'fair return.' ,7
Another expression speaks of a "value factor that reflects interest, risk, and . . .
a decline in income in later years." 8
Where there is no income from the exercise of a property right, the assessor
may look to comparable property and ascertain sales prices or replacement costs.5 9
5B 45 Cal.2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
11 Id. at 563, 564, 290 P.2d at 555.
55 Flying Tiger Line v. Los Angeles, 51 Cal.2d 314, 322, 333 P.2d 323, 330 (1958). See also
Parr-Richmond v. Boyd, 43 Cal.2d 157, 165, 272 P.2d 16, 22 (1954).
51 De Luz Homes, Inc. v. San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 564, 290 P.2d 544, 555, 556 (1955).
57 Id. at 565, 290 P.2d at 556.
,s Id. at 565, n.3, 290 P.2d at 556, n.3.
59 Id. at 563, 290 P.2d at 555. See also Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, 623, 184 P.2d 879,
887 (1947). In San Bernardino County, the assessor has used the method of "capitalizing" the cost
of water from a substitute or alternate supply which seems to be a method to obtain the value of
other property of like kind for comparison purposes. Currently, he uses the price received by the
Metropolitan Water District for its lowest grade of water. This figure is multiplied times the average
annual amount of water pumped by the taxpayer in recent years. Then various factors are deducted,
including a discount of 8%, costs of production and delivery to the nearest market. Of the result,
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Additional factors which could be considered would be availability of substitute
supplies or likelihood that the right in question will continue to result in a water
supply.60
BASIN TO BASIN THEORY
Under the so-called basin to basin theory, the assessor also applies a factor
as a part of his method which takes into consideration whether water is taken
from one sub-basin to be used on lands overlying another sub-basin. This theory
is based on an engineer's report on taxability of water rights. The thought appar-
ently is that unless water is taken out of such sub-basin it has no value, either
because the nearest alternate or substitute supply is located within the same
basin, or that water used in the basin constitutes something akin to overlying
rights. For those pumping water out of a sub-basin the formula includes the
value of a substitute supply at the place of application of the water to the land.
Implicit in this formula is the erroneous legal conclusion that the cost of
water at the place of application of the water is the controlling factor. As noted
above, however, the situs, that is, the location of the right, is the point of
diversion, and the assessor's determination is the value of the property at that
place, not some other place.6 1 The same factors must be applied to all water
rights at their situs. Any substitute supply must be determined in relation to its
delivery at the situs within the county.
In Orange County Water District v. Riverside,62 the court held that the
Santa Ana River basin constitutes one water source. In the case of Pasadena v.
Alhambra,63 the contention was made that the defendant pumped from a different
basin than the plaintiff and therefore should not be limited in the amount of
water taken. The court refuted this argument by pointing to evidence in the
record which indicated the probability of some connection between the basins,
though small, and that there was a demonstrable lowering of water level in
plaintiff's wells following pumpage by the defendant.6 4
In the Spring Valley case the county contended that the situs of the company's
right extended upstream and throughout the watershed. 65 In the Kern Water
Storage case the water district contended that the situs of its right continued
past the point of diversion to the parcels receiving the water. 6 The courts
rejected these theories and designated the situs of the right as the point at which
the water is interrupted in its natural flow and directed to other locations. 7 In
view of these precedents, it is doubtful whether the so-called basin to basin theory
25% is taken as the assessed value for tax purposes. If applied uniformly, the formula would undoubt-
edly be upheld by the courts. A similar formula for assessment of water rights was upheld in Alpaugh
Irrigation District v. Kern, 113 Cal.App.2d 286, 293, 248 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1952).
60 In this regard the San Bernardino assessor considers the alternate source as available and that
the water right taxed will continue to supply water in perpetuity.
11 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
62 173 Cal.App.2d 137, 343, P.2d 450 (1959).
68 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
64 Id. at 923-24, 207 P.2d at 27.
05 Spring Valley Water Co. v. Alameda, 88 Cal.App. 157, 169, 263 Pac. 318, 323 (1927).




would withstand scrutiny by the courts. There is a distinct possibility that the
court could find such a theory to be inherently discriminatory in its effect and
thus invalid.
While errors of judgment will not render a tax void, where the method used
results in different treatment of rights of the same type, the courts have not
hesitated to order tax refunds, even though there was no intent to discriminate.
In Rancho S. M. v. San. Diego,68 for instance, it was held that where the overall
plan of assessment and equalization results in inequality of assessment on similar
types of property, the tax based on such assessment is void. In City of Los Angeles
v. Inyo o9 the facts showed a plan of separate assessment of water rights of each
of the taxpayer's parcels which resulted in assessments for land and water two and
three times as large as those for similar parcels without such separation of taxable
interests. The tax was declared to be invalid.7 0
It is therefore submitted that where the basin to basin theory is being used, it
should be abandoned, and any element of it deleted from the formula for assessing
water rights.
CONCLUSION
By way of summarizing, then, the following conclusions should be noted.
First: A water right is a property right which is subject to taxation. If it is an
overlying right or a right appurtenant to the land served, it is deemed taxed with
the land unless the assessor shows such land and such water right separately on
the assessment roll.
A right to divert water from its place of origin to serve other lands is a separate
property right and may be taxed as such. It is not deemed included in the tax
on the land of origin. This right may become appurtenant to the land of use, and,
if so, would be deemed taxed with the land of use unless the land and water right
are separately shown on the assessment roll.
Second: A water right owned or controlled by a mutual water company is
taxable to the company. Increased assessment on the shareholder's land through
use of water does not result in double taxation of rights owned or controlled by a
mutual water company. The right to divert water to other lands is a property
right which is distinct from the use of the water produced and is taxable whether
the water is or is not used.
Double taxation of the same water right could result if the company does
not own the water right but merely acts as agent for the actual owner of such
rights. The owners must, however, make a timely request for correction on the
assessment roll. Ownership of a water right, or appurtenancy to land is not
presumed merely because of ownership of a share in a mutual water company.
The assessor properly shows the company as owner until such time as competent
proof is presented showing ownership to be in another.
Third: Jurisdiction of the local board of equalization is limited to determining
'1 126 Cal.App. 186, 201, 14 P.2d 588, 594 (1932).
01 167 Cal.App.2d 736, 335 P.2d 166 (1959).
70 Id. at 739, 743, 335 P.2d at 168, 170.
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value for equalization of assessment of property located within the county. The
board may consider any formula for assessing property rights as it may affect
equalization.
Fourth: The assessor may employ any method of determining property values
so long as the resulting assessment bears a reasonable relationship to actual market
value, and if the method has been uniformly and fairly applied. A method which
is inherently discriminatory invalidates the tax, but errors of honest judgment
will not so long as the aforementioned safeguards are observed.
Fifth: Determining value of a water right by "capitalizing" the cost of an
alternate supply equivalent to the water produced in the exercise of the right is a
valid method of assessment. Capitalizing the difference between cost of production
from the right and cost of an equivalent amount of water supply is also a valid
method. In any such capitalization formula, however, the same factors must be
applied to each right at its situs, not at the place of application of the water
to the land.
Finally, whatever basic formula is used, assuming it is otherwise valid, it
should be applied uniformly and without reference to any element of the so-called
"basin to basin" theory.
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